Abstract. In Informatica 32 (2008), Ren and Gu proposed an anonymous hierarchical identity based encryption scheme based on the q-ABDHE problem with full security in the standard model. Later in Indocrypt'08, they proposed another secure hierarchical identity based encryption scheme based on the q-TBDHE problem with full security in the standard model. They claimed that their schemes have short parameters, high efficiency and tight reduction. However, in this paper we give attacks to show their schemes are insecure at all. Concretely, from any first level private key, the adversary can easily derive a proper "private key" which can decrypt any ciphertexts for the target identity. That is to say, one key generation query on any first level identity excluding the target's first level identity, is enough to break their schemes 1 .
Introduction

Backgroud
IBE. In 1984, Shamir [13] first proposed the concept of identity based encryption (IBE) to simplify the certificate management. In traditional public key encryption (PKE) cryptosystem, a user's public key need to be certified by an authority CA to ensure its validity. Therefore, management of certificates is heavy for PKE. However, in an IBE cryptosystem, a user's public key can be represented as an arbitrary string, certificate management can be greatly simplified. Due to this benefit, IBE attracts great attention from the cryptography community. However, the first practical IBE scheme only realized by Boneh and Franklin in 2001 by using bilinear pairings [5] . In Eurocrypt'04, Boneh and Boyen proposed two new efficient selective identity secure (the attacker must commit the target identity before attack) IBE schemes without random oracles (BB 1 IBE and BB 2 IBE) [2] . Later Boneh and Boyen [3] , Waters [14] proposed new IBE schemes with full security (the attacker can adaptively choose the target identity). In Eurocrypt'06, Gentry proposed an efficient identity based encryption with tight security reduction in the standard model but based on a stronger assumption [6] .
HIBE. In practice one big organization always has hierarchical structures, perhaps with one central authority, several sub-authorities and many individual users, each belonging to a small part of the organization tree. IBE technique can not directly apply to this situation, we need a solution where each authority can delegate keys to its sub-authorities, who in turn can keep delegating keys further down the hierarchy to the users. hierarchical identity based encryption (HIBE) is such a system. In HIBE cryptosystem, messages are encrypted for identityvectors, representing nodes in the identity hierarchy. In Eurocrypt'02, Horwitz and Lynn [9] first introduced the concept of HIBE, Gentry and Silverberg [8] give the first fully functional HIBE scheme in Asiacrypt'02. But their scheme was only proved secure in the random oracle. Boneh and Boyen [2] first achieved the selective-ID secure efficient HIBE scheme in the standard model in Eurocrypt'04. But the ciphertext length is linear in the depth of the hierarchy. In Eurocrypt'05, Boneh et al. [4] proposed an efficient selective-ID secure HIBE scheme in the standard model with constant size ciphertext. In 2007, Au et al. [1] claimed to construct a HIBE scheme which is fully secure, but later they found a flaw in their security proof. In Informatica 32 (2008), Ren and Gu [11] claimed to construct a fully secure HIBE scheme with short parameters, high efficiency and tight reduction. Later in Indocrypt'08, they [12] proposed another secure hierarchical identity based encryption scheme with full security in the standard model. But in this paper, we show their schemes are insecure. In TCC'09, Gentry and Halevi [7] proposed fully secure HIBE scheme by using "identity based broadcast encryption with key randomization" (KR-IBBE). In Crypto'09, Waters [15] attained the full security under simple assumption by using "dual system encryption". Recently, Lewko and Waters [10] improved Waters's result to achieve fully secure HIBE with short ciphertexts by using "dual system encryption" in the composite order group.
Our Contribution
We cryptanalysis Ren and Gu's two efficient fully secure HIBE schemes in the standard model. Concretely, from any first level private key, the adversary can easily derive a proper "private key" which can decrypt any ciphertexts for the target identity. That is to say, one query on any first level identity is enough to break their schemes.
Organization
We organize this paper as follows. In section 2, we give the definition and security model for HIBE. In section 3, we review of Ren and Gu's first HIBE scheme and give an attack on it. In section 4, we review of Ren and Gu's second HIBE scheme and give an attack on it. In section 5, we conclude our paper.
Encrypt(params, ID, m). Takes as input the system parameters params and identity vector ID and a message m, it outputs the the ciphertext C. Decrypt(params, C, ID, K ID ). Takes as input the system parameters params, ciphertext C, identity vector ID and corresponding private key K ID , it outputs the message m (or an error message ⊥).
Security Model
IND-ID-CCA2 security for HIBE is defined by the following game between an adversary A and a challenger B.
Setup. The challenger B runs the Setup algorithm and gives A the resulting system parameters params, keeping the master key to itself. Phase 1. A adaptively issues queries q 1 , · · · , q m where query q i is one of the following:
Keygeneration query (ID i ). B responds by running algorithm KeyGen to generate the private key corresponding to ID i and sends d i to A. Decryption query (ID i , c i ). B responds by running algorithm KeyGen to generate the private key corresponding to ID i . It then runs algorithm Decrypt to decrypt the ciphertext c i using the private key d i and sends the resulting plaintext to A. Challenge. A outputs an identity ID * and two equal length plaintexts m 0 , m 1 on which it wishes to be challenged. The only restriction is that A did not previously issue a key generation query for ID or a prefix of ID. B picks a random bit w ∈ {0, 1} and sends c to A,where c = Encrypt(params, ID, m w ). Phase 2. A issues additional queries q m+1 , · · · , q n ,where q i is one of:
Keygeneration query (ID i ) where ID i = ID * and ID i is not a prefix of ID * . Decryption query (ID i , c i ) where c i = c * for ID * or any prefix of ID * . In both cases, B responds as in Phase 1. These queries may be adaptive. Guess. Finally, the adversary outputs a guess w ∈ {0, 1} and wins if w = w . We call an adversary A in the above game an IND-ID-CCA2 adversary. The advantage of A is defined
adversaries making at most q k key generation queries and at most q d encryption queries have advantage at most ε in winning the above game.
3 Attack on Ren and Gu's First HIBE Scheme
Review of Ren and Gu's First HIBE Scheme
In this subsection, we review of Ren and Gu's first HIBE scheme in Informatica 32 (2008) [11] Setup(λ, l). Let p be a large prime number, G 1 , G 2 are groups of order p. e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear map, g is a generator of G 1 , g 1 = g α , where α ∈ Z * p . l is the maximum number of levels in the HIBE, H is a hash function from
KeyGen(params, mk, ID). To a user U with identity
p , the PKG randomly choose r i ∈ Z * p , and computes
be generated by its parent
where r i = r i−1 + t. Encrypt(params, ID, m). To encrypt a message m ∈ G 2 for the user with identity
, the sender randomly choose s ∈ Z * p and compute The correctness of their scheme can be verified as follows:
and
Our Attack
1. In the Setup phase, the challenger B runs the Setup algorithm and gives A the resulting system parameters params, keeping the master key to itself. 2. In Phase 1, A does not issue any query.
In Challenge phase, A outputs an identity ID
and two equal length plaintexts m 0 , m 1 on which it wishes to be challenged. B picks a random bit w ∈ {0, 1} and computes C * = Encrypt(params, ID * , m w ), sends C * to A. Here
where β = H(c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) 4. In Phase 2, A does as follows:
(a) First he queries the keygeneration oracle on a first level identity
to the challenger B, and B returns
l ) By using the KeyDerive algorithm, he derives a proper "private key"
where r i computed following the KeyDerive algorithm, which is a random element in Z * p . (c) Now he can decrypt the challenge ciphertext C * by using K ID * as follows
We can verify its correctness as follows
Obviously, A wins the IND-ID-CCA2 game with probability 1.
Remark 1. This attack shows that, from any first level private key, it is easy for the adversary to derive a proper "private key" which can decrypt any ciphertexts for the target identity.
Attack on Ren and Gu's Second HIBE Scheme
Review of Ren and Gu's Second HIBE Scheme
In this subsection, we review of Ren and Gu's second HIBE scheme in Indocrypt 2008 [12] .
Setup(λ, l). Let p be a large prime number, G 1 , G 2 are groups of order p. e :
is a bilinear map, g is a generator of G 1 , g 1 = g α , where α ∈ Z * p . l is the maximum number of levels in the HIBE, h and H are hash functions
p , the PKG randomly choose r −1,i , r 0,i ∈ Z * p , and computes
where r 0,i = r 0,i−1 + t. Encrypt(params, ID, m). To encrypt a message m ∈ G 2 for the user with identity ID i = [ID 1 , · · · , ID i ], randomly choose s ∈ Z * p and compute
where
By using the KeyDerive algorithm, he derives a proper "private key"
l ) where r 0,i computed following the KeyDerive algorithm, which is a random element in Z * p . (c) Now he can decrypt the challenge ciphertext C * by using K ID * as follows:
-He first computes Remark 2. This attack shows that, from any first level private key, it is easy for the adversary to derive a proper "private key" which can decrypt any ciphertexts for the target identity.
Conclusion
In this paper, we cryptanalysis two efficient HIBE schemes which claimed to be fully secure in the standard model. Our attacks show that, one key generation query on any first level identity excluding the target's first level identity, is enough to break their schemes.
